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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FEIKENS, District Judge. 
 
Before us is an expedited appeal from an order of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania ("District Court") preliminarily enjoining the 
non-compete agreement that was upheld by the Superior 
Court of Massachusetts. The District Court held that there 
is a "virtual certainty" that a permanent injunction would 
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be obtained on the merits by the plaintiff-appellees and 
thus ordered a preliminary injunction effectively foreclosing 
the enforcement of the injunction. 
 
The appeal raises these issues: 
 
1. Does the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S.C. 
S 80b-1 et seq., provide a cause of action for plaintiff- 
appellee? 
 
2. Does the Employee's Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. S 1001 et seq., provide a basis for 
plaintiff-appellees to claim breaches of fiduciary duties by 
defendant-appellant? 
 
3. Is the District Court's preliminary injunction order 
barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2283? 
 
4. Is the District Court's preliminary injunction order 
barred by the Younger abstention doctrine, see Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)? 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In 1996, when Arnold Schneider ("Schneider") decided to 
leave his position as a partner in the Boston-based 
defendant Wellington Management Company ("Wellington") 
and started his own firm, Schneider Capital Management 
("SCM"), in direct competition with Wellington, this dispute 
began. Plaintiffs Frank Russell Company, Frank Russell 
Trust Company, Frank Russell Investment Company, and 
Frank Russell Investment Management Company 
(collectively "Russell"), were Wellington clients serviced by 
Schneider. When Schneider terminated his employment 
with Wellington, Russell transferred several of its accounts 
to SCM. 
 
Schneider joined Wellington upon his graduation from 
college in 1983, and began working as an analyst in its 
Valley Forge, Pennsylvania office. He progressed steadily 
through its ranks and became a partner of the firm in 
1992. His extraordinary flair for picking mid-cap stocks led 
to an average return that exceeded the Standard & Poor's 
500 Index by 7.4% for nine consecutive years, and earned 
him the honor of being recognized as the number one 
performing value manager in the country for the 1993 
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through 1997 time period. Wellington handsomely 
compensated Schneider for his efforts; he earned over $1.4 
million in his last year of employment with thefirm. 
 
Russell is active in providing financial services and 
regularly tracks more than 2200 investment management 
firms such as Wellington. ERISA plans and other 
institutional investors pay for this information to aid in the 
selection and monitoring of their investment managers. 
This leads to a complicated relationship with Wellington 
because in some instances Russell and Wellington have 
joint clients and refer business to each other, while at other 
times they are direct competitors. In the present 
circumstance, Russell was a client of Wellington's and had 
entrusted over $1 billion to Wellington's care. The relevant 
contracts between Russell and Wellington gave Russell the 
right to terminate the relationship without notice. 
Wellington was required to give 30-days notice before it 
terminated the contract. Of the four Russell entities, only 
Frank Russell Trust Company ("FRTC"), involved assets 
covered by ERISA. For that contract, Wellington specifically 
acknowledged it was an ERISA fiduciary. 
 
Wellington is a 54-member limited liability partnership 
engaged in the business of providing investment advice to 
its clients. For this, it is paid a fixed percentage of those 
assets under its control and controls over $200 billion of 
clients' money. Wellington divides responsibility among its 
staff in such a way that certain employees are solely 
responsible for attracting new business while others focus 
exclusively on providing investment advice. Non-compete 
agreements are crucial to this division of labor because 
they prevent partners from "poaching" clients if they leave 
the firm. Schneider signed such a non-compete agreement. 
The non-compete clause prevents partners who leave the 
firm from "providing investment advisory or investment 
management services" in any capacity for a period of three 
years, and prohibits doing business with "any client of the 
Partnership" for a period of five years. Either of these 
provisions may be waived at the managing partners' 
discretion. 
 
The events which triggered a cluster of lawsuits began 
when Schneider tendered his letter of resignation on June 
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22, 1996. As required, Schneider gave six months notice 
before his date of departure on December 22, 1996. 
Duncan McFarland ("McFarland"), Wellington's managing 
partner, did not believe Schneider would go into direct 
competition with Wellington. Based on his prior experience 
with departing partners, McFarland was confident that if 
Schneider did intend to compete with Wellington, he could 
be talked out of it. McFarland thought Wellington's 
interests would best be served if Schneider and Wellington 
would jointly approach Schneider's clients to try to 
persuade them to keep their business at Wellington. Hoping 
Schneider would favor such an arrangement, McFarland 
spent the months following Schneider's June 
announcement attempting to learn what Schneider planned 
to do after he left Wellington. 
 
Schneider had a different agenda. His intention was to 
start his own investment advisory business, and he wanted 
his new firm to service as many of his former Wellington 
clients as possible. Schneider wanted to reach a "fee- 
sharing" agreement with McFarland in which Wellington 
would waive the non-compete covenants in exchange for a 
portion of the revenue Schneider generated from 
Wellington's former clients. Schneider was always vague as 
to his future plans because he believed McFarland would 
react negatively if he found out Schneider was going to 
compete with Wellington. Schneider continually provided 
McFarland with non-committal responses regarding his 
post-Wellington plans despite the fact that he had taken 
concrete steps to prepare for the opening of SCM. 
 
In the meantime, Russell and Schneider had been in 
contact regarding Schneider's impending departure. Russell 
privately assured Schneider that it intended to follow him 
to his new firm. In order to avoid the non-compete 
agreement's restriction on soliciting Wellington clients, 
Russell conducted its due diligence inquiry into SCM by 
submitting written questions to Schneider. Schneider 
responded by giving a complete update on his progress. The 
responses to Russell's inquiries were more detailed than 
Schneider's answers to similar verbal queries by 
McFarland. 
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By November of 1996, McFarland became increasingly 
concerned that Schneider intended to "steal" Wellington 
clients. McFarland expressed his concerns at an emergency 
meeting of the full partnership on December 3, 1996. 
Schneider then spoke in his own defense. After Schneider 
left the meeting, the partnership voted 47-5 to expel him 
unless he accepted a proposal providing Wellington would 
waive his non-compete agreement if he would agree not to 
service any former Wellington clients. Schneider refused 
this proposal and was summarily terminated. 
 
On December 17, Russell canceled its contract with 
Wellington and immediately moved its assets to SCM. Two 
other former Wellington clients, the State of Utah 
Retirement Board, and RJR Nabisco, made similar 
transfers. 
 
Wellington then initiated suit in the Massachusetts state 
court and sought an injunction enforcing the non-compete 
agreement Schneider signed. After holding a full trial on the 
merits and presiding over the case for more than a year, 
the Massachusetts court issued a 115-page opinion 
upholding the five-year ban on doing business with 
Wellington clients, and striking the three-year ban on 
working in the investment advisory business on the 
grounds that it was an unreasonable restriction. The 
February 17, 1998, opinion also awarded Schneider certain 
unpaid incentive compensation that is not presently in 
dispute. That court enjoined Schneider (the "Massachusetts 
injunction") from doing business with any Wellington client 
for five years, effective 60 days after the entry of the order 
(April 17, 1998). The delay in the effective date of the 
judgment was designed to give Russell the 30-days notice it 
would have had if Wellington terminated their contract. 
While Russell was not a party to the Massachusetts 
proceedings, it filed three affidavits in the case, presented 
two days of testimony, and submitted an amicus brief. 
 
On March 31, 1998, three weeks prior to the effective 
date of the Massachusetts' injunction, Russell brought the 
suit which involves this appeal in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. Represented by some of the same attorneys 
who worked for Russell in the Massachusetts proceeding, 
Russell sought an injunction enjoining Wellington from 
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enforcing the non-compete agreement. The Utah Retirement 
Board, one of Schneider's other former Wellington clients, 
brought a similar suit against Wellington in the United 
States District Court of Utah. That district court denied the 
requested injunctive relief, and the case is pending on 
appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit. See Utah State Retirement Bd. and Office v. 
Wellington Management Co., No. 98-4060 (10th Cir.). 
Wellington also sought declaratory judgment against RJR 
Nabisco, Schneider's other former Wellington client, in the 
United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts asking that the Massachusetts injunction be 
declared enforceable. That case is still pending in the 
district court. Wellington Management Co. v. RJR Nabisco, 
Inc., No. 98-10916 (D. Mass.). 
 
Russell argues it is entitled to enjoin Wellington from 
enforcing the non-compete agreement because such 
enforcement will cause Wellington to breach itsfiduciary 
duties under ERISA and its duties under the Investment 
Advisers Act. The breach of these duties, it argues, will 
cause it to involuntarily switch investment advisors. The 
new advisor, as is alleged to be the custom, will then sell 
Russell's present holdings to avoid being tied to any 
questionable investments Schneider may have made. This 
sell-off will necessitate Russell having to incur commissions 
and adverse tax consequences on the order of $13-25 
million. 
 
Since the Massachusetts injunction was scheduled to 
become effective on April 17, 1998, the District Court 
expedited the hearing on Russell's motion for a preliminary 
injunction. In its opinion issued on April 13, shortly after 
the hearing, the court found that Russell would suffer 
irreparable harm if the non-compete agreement was 
enforced and that Russell had "a virtual certainty" of 
success on the merits. The District Court therefore enjoined 
Wellington from enforcing the non-compete provision, in 
effect precluding it from enforcement of the Massachusetts 
injunction. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review the terms of the preliminary injunction for an 
abuse of discretion, underlying questions of law receive de 
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novo review, and factual determinations are reviewed for 
clear error. Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 652 
(3d Cir. 1994). The standard of review of the Anti- 
Injunction Act and the Younger abstention doctrine is de 
novo. 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan for Eligible Employees 
of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 403 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 
III. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS 
 
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving 
party must show 1) irreparable injury, 2) a rea sonable 
probability of success on the merits, 3) the harm to it 
outweighs the possible harm to other interested parties, 
and 4) harm to the public. Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco 
Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1980). A court 
then balances these four Continental factors to determine if 
an injunction should issue. Russell argues it has a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits because Wellington has 
breached its fiduciary duties arising under ERISA and its 
duties under the Investment Advisers Act.1  Wellington 
allegedly breached these duties when 1) it sought to 
enforce the Massachusetts injunction to the detriment of 
Russell, and 2) when it signed Russell as a client  in 1989 
without informing Russell that its partners, one of which 
was Schneider, were bound by non-compete agreements. 
 
To determine whether or not Russell can show a 
likelihood (or reasonable probability) of success on the 
merits, Russell must be able to show that it has a cause of 
action against Wellington based on the Investment Advisers 
Act ("Act") or that Wellington violated duties, if any, it owed 
to Russell under ERISA. 
 
A. Investment Advisers Act 
 
Of the four distinct Russell entities, Wellington only 
managed ERISA assets for FRTC. This means Wellington's 
fiduciary responsibilities, if any, to the other three Russell 
companies arise exclusively from the Act. Before Russell 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Russell also makes reference to Wellington'sfiduciary responsibilities 
arising under Washington state law. No citation to any case or statute 
invoking Washington law is ever made, so we do not address this 
contention. 
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can attain any relief for the non-ERISA entities, it must 
satisfy the threshold requirement of showing that the Act 
entitles it to bring a cause of action against Wellington. 
 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 "was the last in a 
series of Acts designed to eliminate certain abuses in the 
securities industry, abuses which were found to have 
contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the 
depression of the 1930's. ... A fundamental purpose, 
common to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy 
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and 
thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the 
securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
 
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis , 444 
U.S. 11 (1979), the Supreme Court ruled on the issue 
whether the Investment Advisers Act created a private right 
of action. The Court held 15 U.S.C. S 80b-15 ("S 215") 
creates a private right of action for a plaintiff who seeks to 
void an investment advisor contract.2 
 
This includes the right to bring a suit to obtain "the 
customary legal incidents of voidness ... including the 
availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. "(a) Waiver of compliance as void 
 
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive 
compliance with any provision of this subchapter or with any rule, 
regulation or order thereunder shall be void. 
 
       (b) Rights affected by invalidity 
 
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter 
and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of 
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or 
practice in violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, 
regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void (1)  as regard the rights 
of 
any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or 
order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such 
contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any per son who, not being a 
party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with 
actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or 
performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision." 15 
U.S.C. S 80b-15. 
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against continued operation of the contract, and for 
restitution." Id. at 19. The Court noted that 15 U.S.C. 
S 80b-6 ("S 206") failed to create an express right for a 
private party to bring a damages remedy and that Congress 
actually removed such a clause from the section prior to its 
passage. Thus, the Court concluded that "[u]nlike S 215, 
S 206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in 
terms create or alter any civil liabilities." Id. at 19. We 
conclude that "there exists a limited private remedy under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to void an investment 
advisers contract, but that the Act confers no other private 
causes of action, legal or equitable." Id. at 24. 
 
Transamerica has a clear application to the present case. 
If Russell seeks to void its contract with Wellington under 
S 215, it has a cause of action. Otherwise, it does not. 
Russell's contracts with Wellington have not been in force 
since they were voluntarily canceled by Russell on 
December 17, 1996. Clearly this lawsuit is not an attempt 
to void an investment advisor contract. In effect, Russell 
affirms the contract by bringing suit on the S 206 fiduciary 
obligations the contract gave rise to. Transamerica 
expressly prevents a private party from suing for a breach 
of the S 206 duties.3 
 
Since Russell cannot bring an action against Wellington 
for breach of any duty arising under the Investment 
Advisers Act, it has no likelihood of eventual success on 
this issue. 
 
B. ERISA 
 
The contract Wellington signed with FRTC specifies that 
Wellington is an ERISA fiduciary. Under ERISA, 
 
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Russell cites a number of cases and administrative proceedings where 
a defendant was found to have violated S 206. See Capital Gains; SEC. v. 
Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In the Matter of Aetna Capital 
Management, and Aetna Financial Services, Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 
3-8119, 1993 SEC LEXIS 2090 (Aug. 19, 1993). These cases are in 
conjunction with Transamerica's bar to private actions enforcing S 206 
because they all involve actions initiated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
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plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and - 
 
       (A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
       (i) providing benefits to participants and their 
       beneficiaries; and 
 
       (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administerin g the 
       plan; 
 
       (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under 
       the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
       acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
       would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 
       character and with like aims; 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1104(1) ("S 404"). Russell claims Wellington 
breached these duties by seeking to enforce the 
Massachusetts injunction and by failing to inform Russell 
that a non-compete clause was part of the partnership 
agreement. Additionally, Russell argues that enforcing the 
non-compete agreement would be illegal because it would 
be a prohibited transaction under ERISA. 
 
1. Breach of duty by seeking to enforce the 
   Massachusetts Injunction 
 
None of the cases cited by Russell directly holds that 
ERISA fiduciary responsibilities prevent a fiduciary from 
enforcing a non-compete agreement against a former 
employee. Its closest case is Glaziers and Glassworkers 
Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Securities, 
Inc., 93 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996). In Glaziers, the defendant 
brokerage firm Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. ("Janney") 
discovered that Michael Lloyd, one of its brokers, might 
have altered the date on a cashier's check to make it 
appear he had made timely payment of a nearly $10,000 
debt. Consequently, Janney forced Lloyd to resign. Janney 
then filed a complete report of the incident to the National 
Association of Securities Dealers. The administrators of the 
plaintiff pension plans whose assets Lloyd serviced, 
however, were not informed of Lloyd's potential dishonesty. 
Janney kept the matter from the administrators because 
there was no uncontroverted proof that Lloyd had 
committed the suspected alteration. The pension plans 
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followed Lloyd when he left Janney, and ultimately had over 
$2 million of their funds embezzled by Lloyd. The plans 
sued Janney for breaching its ERISA fiduciary duties when 
it failed to inform them of the reasons for Lloyd's 
termination. The panel in Glaziers reversed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to Janney because, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Lloyd's 
apparently fraudulent conduct could have been a material 
fact which Janney had a fiduciary duty to disclose. 
 
Russell reads Glaziers for the proposition that Janney 
violated its fiduciary duties when it did not volunteer the 
reason for Lloyd's termination out of fear of a potential 
defamation suit. Russell argues Wellington similarly 
breached its fiduciary duties when it chose to enforce the 
Massachusetts injunction for its own business reasons even 
though enforcement conflicts with Russell's interests. 
Russell's position suggests that any decision made by a 
fiduciary needs to be done for the "exclusive" benefit of the 
ERISA beneficiary. Glaziers expressly disavowed such a 
position when it stated "[w]e do not, of course, hold that 
one who may have attained a fiduciary status thereby has 
an obligation to disclose all details of its personnel 
decisions that may somehow impact upon the course of 
dealings with a beneficiary/client." Id.  at 1182. 
 
Such a limitation on the scope of a fiduciary's duties 
follows the statutory language of S 404. This section states 
that fiduciary responsibilities only arise when the fiduciary 
"discharge[s] his duties with respect to a plan." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1104(1) (emphasis added). Cases hold that a decision 
which is "strictly a corporate management business 
decision ... impose[s] no fiduciary duties." Payonek v. HMW 
Industries, Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1989). See 
also Haberen v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined 
Benefit Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1994) 
("the critical question is whether [the defendants] were 
acting in their management capacity when they reduced 
[plaintiff's] salary. ... If they were, then they breached no 
duty under ERISA for, as they contend, ERISA does not 
impose fiduciary duties on employers acting in their 
management capacity."); Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
863 F.2d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding defendant had no 
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fiduciary duty because "[i]t can hardly be disputed that the 
initiation of these programs was a business decision rather 
than a fiduciary decision."). 
 
Russell tries to avoid the implication of the "business 
decision" exception by arguing it is applied only when the 
fiduciary is an employer. In those circumstances it argues 
courts invoke the "two hats" metaphor to distinguish 
between when a company acts as employer (thus, "wearing 
a non-fiduciary hat"), and when it acts in afiduciary 
capacity ("wearing a fiduciary hat"). Since Wellington is not 
an employer, Russell believes the business decision 
exception is inapplicable. 
 
We reject this contention. No authority supports Russell's 
position that an employer is relieved of its ERISA 
obligations when it acts strictly in a business capacity but 
other fiduciaries are not similarly relieved. Section 404 
simply states "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participant." 
It does not create different or extra duties for those 
fiduciaries who are not employers. Section 404 exempts 
any fiduciary from the obligations when it is not acting 
"with respect to a plan." A fiduciary who acts in a strictly 
business capacity is not acting "with respect to a plan." 
 
Was Wellington's decision to seek enforcement of the 
non-compete agreement taken strictly for internal business 
reasons? While the District Court made no findings as to 
this issue, the record strongly suggests it was an internal 
business matter. Wellington's non-compete agreement has 
been in effect for years prior to the present dispute. It 
governs Wellington partners whether or not they conduct 
business with an ERISA entity. The non-compete agreement 
is an integral part of Wellington's corporate structure 
because it enables the firm to have a separate department 
devoted exclusively to recruiting clients without the risk 
that these clients will be "stolen" by departing partners. The 
non-compete agreement has been used as part of 
Wellington's leverage to reach amicable arrangements with 
prior departing partners.4 Any Russell client having an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note, too, that the Massachusetts court has decided that the non- 
compete clause is legitimate and enforceable under Massachusetts law. 
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ERISA plan serviced by the prior departing partners would 
have been unaffected by the non-compete agreement. It is 
only because Schneider disavowed any effect of the non- 
compete agreement upon him that Wellington has been 
forced to protect its interests. Part of the final (appealable) 
judgment of the Massachusetts case means Russell will no 
longer have the investment advisor of its choice. Such an 
impact on an ERISA plan is far more attenuated than any 
of a number of employer decisions leading to the 
termination of a plan which have been held to be strictly 
business decisions. See Payonek, 883 F.2d at 225 n.5 (and 
cases cited therein). Thus, Wellington made a business 
decision when it chose to enforce the non-compete 
agreement. 
 
2. Duty to disclose 
 
Russell also argues that a breach of a fiduciary duty 
occurred in 1989 when it originally signed with Wellington 
as a client, but Wellington failed to inform it that 
Wellington's partners were bound by non-compete 
agreements. Russell again relies on Glaziers to argue this 
was a breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty. Russell now cites 
Glaziers for the proposition that Wellington violated its 
S 404 "affirmative obligation" to disclose the material fact 
that it used non-compete agreements "even absent a 
request [for such information] by the beneficiary." Glaziers, 
93 F.3d at 1181. 
 
Russell is correct in stating Wellington had an affirmative 
fiduciary duty to disclose material information. The 
question is whether Wellington's failure to disclose its use 
of non-compete agreements was a material omission"which 
the beneficiary must know for its own protection." Id. at 
1182. The District Court implicitly found that the non- 
compete covenant was a material fact because Wellington 
could use it to impose significant transaction costs on 
Russell by discharging Schneider. This is an erroneous 
conclusion. 
 
Wellington correctly notes that no published authority 
requires an ERISA fiduciary to reveal that one of its 
employees is bound by a non-compete agreement. There are 
any number of internal matters between Wellington and its 
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employees that could have caused Russell's account to be 
inadequately serviced. These matters include things such 
as staffing policies, vacation allotments, and potentially 
inadequate compensation. Wellington obviously had no 
obligation to reveal to Russell the minutiae of its internal 
operations. It was only required to reveal that information 
which, when viewed without the benefit of hindsight, 
Wellington reasonably believed Russell would need to know 
for its own protection. In this case, Wellington had the 
express contractual right to terminate its relationship with 
Russell, for any reason, on 30-days notice. Wellington 
therefore always had the power to impose substantial 
transaction costs on Russell. The fact that Wellington could 
impose these same transactions costs through the 
additional circuitous route of 1) terminating its relationship 
with a full partner of the firm, and 2) winning a lawsuit 
enforcing the non-compete agreement, is insufficient to 
make the existence of a non-compete agreement a material 
fact. Wellington's ability to impose these transaction costs 
on Russell for any reason makes the non-compete 
agreement, when viewed in the light of events as they stood 
in 1989, an immaterial internal arrangement between 
Wellington and its partners. Thus, Wellington breached no 
duty by failing to inform Russell of its existence. 
 
3. Prohibited Transaction 
 
Finally, Russell argues 29 U.S.C. S 1106(a)(1)(c) only 
allows Russell to contract with Wellington if the agreement 
between the two parties is "reasonable" under 29 U.S.C. 
S 1108(b)(2). The United States Department of Labor's 
interpretive guidelines at 29 C.F.R. S 2550.408b-2(c) state: 
 
       No contract or arrangement is reasonable within the 
       meaning of section 408(b)(2) [29 U.S.C. S 1108(b)(2)] ... 
       if it does not permit termination by the plan without 
       penalty to the plan on reasonably short notice under 
       the circumstance to prevent the plan from becoming 
       locked into an arrangement that has become 
       disadvantageous. 
 
Seizing upon the "without penalty" language, Russell 
argues it will be forced to pay a $13-25 million penalty if it 
cannot continue to use Schneider's services. Section 
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2550.408b-2(c) disallows such a penalty and therefore 
Russell contends Wellington should be prohibited from 
enforcing the non-compete agreement. 
 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, we note that 
Schneider is far more responsible for imposing the $13-25 
million potential costs on Russell than Wellington is. It was 
Schneider's choice to sign the non-compete agreement, 
Schneider's choice to leave Wellington, and Schneider's 
choice to accept Russell's business in violation of the 
agreement. Russell had been aware of Schneider's intention 
to leave Wellington, and Wellington's non-compete 
agreement, at least as early as June of 1996 when 
Schneider informed it of these facts. Hence, Wellington is 
not the party responsible for Russell having to pay these 
costs. 
 
Second, Russell's argument completely misstates the 
meaning of the word "penalty." The simple fact is that 
Wellington will never see a dime of the $13-25 million 
"penalty" it is allegedly seeking to impose. The "penalty" in 
this case is not a liquidated sum Wellington charges to 
Russell. Instead, the transaction costs arise out of the 
nature of Russell's business. At any time when Russell 
switches investment advisors it may incur these expenses. 
Even if Russell were to remain a Wellington client, Russell 
would presumably still incur the $13-25 million cost 
because the new Wellington advisor would need to make 
the same type of alterations to Russell's holdings as any 
other advisor. Thus, Russell is not "locked" into doing 
business with Wellington. Since S 2550.408b-2(c) only 
prohibits a contract which "locks" the ERISA plan into 
doing business on unfavorable terms, the non-compete 
agreement does not violate this regulation and this theory 
has no likelihood of success on the merits. 
 
IV. ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT AND YOUNGER 
    ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 
 
Wellington also argues that the Anti-Injunction Act and 
the Younger abstention doctrine provide grounds to reverse 
the District Court's grant of an injunction. The Anti- 
Injunction Act, 29 U.S.C. S 2283, prevents a federal court 
from staying proceedings in a pending state court case.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay 
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of 
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The District Court's injunction barring Wellington from 
seeking enforcement of the Massachusetts injunction seems 
to facially violate this act. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. 
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 
(1970). Instead of arguing that one of the Anti-Injunction 
Act's statutory exceptions applies, Russell focuses on 
showing the Anti-Injunction Act does not affect it because 
of the judicially-created "stranger to the litigation" doctrine. 
See County of Imperial, California v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54 
(1980). We note some difficulty in the argument that 
Russell was a "stranger" to the Massachusetts proceeding 
because it submitted three affidavits, two days of 
testimony, and an amicus brief in that case. Because we 
have an adequate means for deciding this case without 
reaching this issue, we defer ruling on it. 
 
The Younger abstention doctrine6  creates an additional 
set of circumstances in which a federal court is prohibited 
from enjoining an on-going state action. This occurs when 
1) there is an on-going state judicial proceeding,  2) the 
state proceeding implicates an important state interest, and 
3) the state proceeding provides an adequate oppor tunity to 
raise the constitutional issue. FOCUS v. Allegheny County 
Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 1996). 
The pending appeal in Massachusetts state court clearly 
satisfies the first requirement of the Younger doctrine. 
Massachusetts' interest in preventing the judgments of its 
courts from being nullified, in part, by a federal court order 
may arguably fulfill the second requirements.7 The third 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. S 2283. 
 
6. So named because the Supreme Court first announced it in Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 
7. It is difficult to find an important state interest involved in 
Wellington's attempt to enforce its internal non-compete agreement. 
However, once the Massachusetts Superior Court enjoined Schneider 
from working for any former Wellington clients, Massachusetts then may 
have acquired a compelling interest in seeing that the orders and 
judgments of its court were "not rendered nugatory." Pennzoil Co. v. 
Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987); see also Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 
101, 109 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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element may be satisfied by showing that Russell's 
relationship with Schneider was so "intertwined" that the 
Massachusetts proceeding gave Russell the opportunity to 
raise its federal claims. See New Jersey-Philadelphia 
Presbytery of the Bible Presbyterian Church v. New Jersey 
State Board of Higher Educ., 654 F.2d 868, 878 (3d Cir. 
1981). Because these contested issues are not necessary for 
a resolution of this case, we again decline to rule on them. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Having reviewed all of Russell's theories, it is clear that 
Russell has little likelihood of success on any of them. With 
such a weak showing on likelihood of success, Russell is 
unable to satisfy the Continental balancing test regardless 
of its strength on any other element. Therefore, we 
REVERSE the District Court's order and REMAND with 
instructions to DISSOLVE the preliminary injunction 
preventing Wellington from enforcing the non-compete 
agreement. 
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